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The significance of information and communication technology (ICT)
has been widely felt not only within a state but also among and between
the states in their multifarious day-to-day interactions. Information and
communication technology can be rightly said as constituting the nerve center
of, both, domestic and international politics. These have become guiding
metaphor for domestic and international politics to maintain stability and
political order, provide peace and security and protect people from natural
catastrophes. Sovereign state systems are no longer impregnable, sacrosanct;
the unhindered flow of information and the revolutionary exposure of the
people irrespective of which state, security or culture they belong to, to the
very sinews of information, have made the entire world a melting pot of
the absoluteness and arbitrariness of states. Earlier, issues confined to the
boundary of the state or states have turned out to be global and mustered
support from all sections, countries, nations and culture of the world. A new
kind of threat from information and communication technologies seems to
affect the states.
Some would argue walking on the conventionally trodden furrows that
state is still the main player in international politics maintaining its supremacy
in providing security even in cyberspace.2 Others in a different vein maintain
that the emergence of “virtual states” and network economies imply a decline
of inter-state violence and hence the predominant role “security” playing in
the past gets a plummeting. This optimistic undertone “sketches a future with
an ever widening zone of international peace.”2 Still, there are many who
hold that the information revolution has spurred many firms, interest
organisations, social movements, individuals and transnational relations into
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a network of activities and inter connections. Hence these non-state actors
have become challengers to and providers of security.3
In other words, the general observation is that the information revolution
has bunked the established notion that security is the unrivalled monopolistic
concern of states only, and distance security away from state into an
increasingly important concern of all sectors of society. Today all modern
societies are information societies. Taking into account Arnold Wolfers
definition of security as “the absence of threat to acquired values” it can be
said that a threat to information services can be equally considered a threat to
the acquired value of the society.
The challenges of information revolution for both security and its
apparatus state remain unexplored in terms of policy and substantive issues.
In the past no effort has been made to apply and develop theory on this topic.
No serious efforts have been made to apply international relation (IR) theory
in analysing the information revolution. It seems warranted to study the impact
of information services on security and for development of international
relation theory. John Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello have made a
commendable attempt at dovetailing the information revolution into the ambit
of international relation.
During the post-WW II period, the discipline of IR was almost content
with its Euro centric stance and putting on the Western straight jacket in
analysing the events in the world it tried to look at with its own glass. It
claimed universality and parsimony on the ground of the events in the world
being understood on Western logic and idioms. This claim to universality and
parsimony was at the expense of empirical applicability.4 That means, the
empirical applicability requires a greater degree of complexity and contextually
contingent thinking than has been provided by the dominant international
relation theories.5 For example, theories such as Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realism
and Keohane and Nye’s theory of complex interdependence were considered
either irrelevant or secondary to claims of internal validity.6 Utter discontent-
ment with this inward looking obsession with theoretical consistency appeared
on the scene with the demise of Cold War.7 The end of Cold War signalled a
major crisis for neo realism and IR theories for having failed to predict and
explain the turn of events.
The Digital Age Literature Silent on the Security Issue
Marxist sociologist Manuel Castells was the fast proponent of the digital
age. As early as the late 1980s, he noted that information had become the
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primary resource of material productivity in the newly emerging “knowledge
economy.”8 Information technology’s influence was felt on banking, air travel,
water, or energy distribution for their functioning. In the 1990s the network
of information technology was all set to constitute an indispensable coping
stone for modern and advanced societies. As pointed out by Castells, it was
not long to see the dawn of global network society with nation states being
stripped of their sovereignty and replaced by alternative identities and
communities.9
He pointed to the perspective of transnational crime as will rise becoming
the greatest potential threat to global security. Hamid Mowlana, another
international scholar worked in a similar vein and agreed with Castells’
analysis. But their study is limited to the impact of ICTs on organised crime,10
military strategic communication and the use of information was propaganda.11
According to Eriksson and Giacomello, Mowlana’s work, though insightful,
was weak in linking the information revolution to IR theory.
Control of Information by Governments to Preserve Sovereignty and
Security
Before information revolution could affect the state, and reach out to
the control of non-state actors, the main function to preserve national
sovereignty and national security centered around the state’s ability to control
information flows.12 The communication system was a one-way flow through
radio and television from the national government to the entire people with
its own monitored, cooked and controlled message. Increasingly in recent
years, the state’s stranglehold over information flows has slackened due to
professional media organisations, human rights organisations, non-
governmental organisations and individuals having taken advantage of the
same communication system to exercise control over flow of information,
produce counter claims, independent views and non-governmental
information. The ingrained impregnability of state sovereignty seems to be
made porous by the uninterrupted international flow of information from one
corner to another. The entire nation has been exposed to the outside world
and the inviolability of its sovereignty has been peeled off, layer by layer, by
the flow of information to the outside world under its very nose. The
international flow of information has been taking place so rapidly that the
capability of states to control and monitor the ingoing and outgoing
information is utterly compromised. This network of information flows
transcending the traditional boundary of states has resulted in reinforcing an
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integrated world communication system, which no longer remains captive to
the control of state sovereignty.13
It is not that the importance of information was unknown to the states or
the latter were not vulnerable to the assaulting power of the information. A
report to the Swedish government, the Tengelin Report, also emphasised the
main risks of a networked society including dependence on foreign vendors
and the threat of hackers’ raids.14
But, presently most governments are quite aware and even affected by
the fact that the uncontrolled information flows transcending the territorial
boundaries of states. This cross-county information flows and the easy
accessibility of individuals to new channels and sources outside the country
about its own political and economic structures, are very likely to affect the
attitude of its own citizenry vis-a-vis its political and economic structure.
When the states had control over its radio and TV channel and other free flow
of information was not possible, when the information revolution was as its
nascence, the extraordinary influence of information in forming the political
attitude of the people vis-a-vis its state was subject to control and
manoeuvrability. The difference is that what was once one-way traffic has
now become multiple traffic with multiple entry points making the entire
sovereign state system look like a porous pot and emasculating it to block the
penetration of that information.15
What has changed the concept of security is the prominence that the global
information society has given to ICTs in our thinking and approach to life.
With the industrial revolution and invention of machines, human beings put
machines in the centrality of their security. Machines could communicate
with each other and become provider of security with more accuracy and
precision at a faster rate than human beings could have been able to do in the
past. With it also grows the psychological effect of fear and the dehumanising
consequences of machines doing blunders. The solutions to societal problems
were found in the machines. More than these machines, the development of
computers could herald optimistic visions of technical solutions to societal
problems or “technological fixes” as well as feelings of fear of these computers
being turned evil.16 Too much dependence on computers as the vital decision
maker and sole arbiter of well-being and development of human beings has
marked a drastic change in human society thinking and at the same time
exposed human beings to the wrong or evil computers. Computers being
masters of human destiny can escape into the hands of terrorists and evildoers
to wreck havoc on humanity on a large scale than it could have been possible
in the past. The entire world seems to be caught not in the network of
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human relations, but in a network of communications. Subject to intrigue
manipulation, computers through their electronic gadgets can create
revolutionary psychological dimensions of network.
The most famous computer network, the Internet, is at the same time an
infrastructure and a communication medium. “On the same wires and with
the same protocol, packets transport bytes that represent radically different
information: an email to a friend, details on one’s flight itinerary, online
multiplayer gaming, statistics on a municipality’s water consumption, or credit
card numbers.”17
Most of the communication being public, anybody using the medium
could read them. Earlier computer networks were proprietary linking together
a bank with its subsidiaries or US strategic command with nuclear missile
silos was too expensive to be afforded by other organisations and institutions.
Further, they used protocols that authorised their legitimate users to be in the
network. Today the cost of networking has been comparatively less expensive
and easily affordable with availability of multiple channels and unobstructed
accessibility. The network of communication has been very simple making
everybody nude. What was unnoticed, unwanted, undesirable or improper
to intrude, has now become public. When man was the master and sole
communicator the security of communication was fully insulated from others’
intrusion. Today, Internet easily passing into every hand has taken away the
security of communication at a higher price of providing sinews and
opportunities to criminals and evil mongers to exploit the vulnerabilities of
the network for their own narrow interest.
Cyber Threats in the Post Cold War Security Thinking: A Theoretical
Understanding
The end of Cold War marked remarkably a downsize in the budgetary
allocation for defense and military establishment. A shift of focus on
conventional warfare to information security and cyber threats was perceived.
Allusion to buzzwords like critical information, protection, information
warfare, information operations, information assurance, cyber terrorism and
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) became common among the analyst
and policy maker in defense and military establishments.
The increased vulnerability of individuals, people, security and states to
information resolution and loss of control over it has given rise to a fear
resulting in what is termed as cyber threat. This has been owing to the
transformation of industrial society into an information society.18
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Images of cyber threats are found dominating in both public and private
spheres, among both military as well as civilian actors. These became rampant
with the world coming under the global computer network and communication.
In the business community and within police, cyber crime has become a salient
threat image.
With the bureaucratic-military establishment, perceived threats have been
framed as information warfare, information operation, cyber terrorism and
cyber war. Both state and non-state actors can come within the targets and
adversaries of image of cyber threats.19
According to Eriksson and Giacomello, “states are still typically seen as
the single most important type of potential enemy, able to neutralise effectively
the critical infrastructure of another country.”20
There is no dearth of literature to show the theoretical dramatisation of
the potential cyber threats and information security. A study by the National
Research Council argues that “Tomorrow’s terrorist may be able to do more
with a keyboard than with a bomb.”21 Former US Homeland Security Director
Tom Ridge (2002) observed that “Terrorists can sit at one computer connected
to one network and can create world havoc – [they] do not necessarily need
bombs or explosive to cripple a sector of the economy or shut down a power
grid.” The view doing the round is that the governments and societies are
becoming more dependent on and comfortable with information technology,
but at the same time are becoming increasingly vulnerable to all sorts of
cyber threats being dramatised theoretically. The glaring example of cyber
threats being theoretically dramatised is the electronic Pearl Harbor.22
It is a dramatised apocalyptic vision of a situation where all governments’
critical infrastructures and foundations totally depending on information
technology would come to a grinding halt. Banks, phone system, subway
cars would come to a standstill putting thousands of people in jeopardy. This
became the cynosure of many newspapers and media in the US, and its policy
makers in certain circles started working on this. Former Deputy Defense
Minister John Hamre argued that “we are facing the possibility of an electronic
Pearl Harbor…There is going to be an electronic attack on this country
sometime in the future.”23
But, there are critics who jibe at such rhetorical dramatisation of potential
cyber threats, castigating these as highly unlikely. Denning (2001 b) argues
that cyber terrorism, defined as digital attacks, causing physical destruction
and human deaths is extremely unlikely. Even the US Naval War College in
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cooperation with the Gartner Group concluded that an “electronic Pearl
Harbor”, although theoretically possible was highly unlikely: “These are far
simpler and less costly ways to attack critical infrastructure, from hoax phone
calls to track bombs and hijacked airliners.”24
The major impact of information operations is the symbolic and the main
effect is humiliation. Operating with online transactions, the firms incur a
heavy financial loss. To a large degree cyber attacks are attacks with and
against symbol and images. Denial of service attacks and the defacing of web
pages certainly can have material consequences.
According to some analyst, the cyber attacks have been mostly
transnational and network based.25 Adversaries can be termed as network actors
consisting of relatively independent nodes of individuals, groups, organisations
or even states capable of quickly assembling and dispersing, even long before
an attack has been discovered. These actors operating in loosely organised
networks and using such means can resort to asymmetric warfare.26 These
warfares may not be conventional military conflicts, but are capable of
wreaking serious damages by attacking and exploiting the vulnerabilities of
information system by resorting to cyber attacks.27
The conventional understanding of sovereign state system is premised
on boundary making and spatial distancing. With the prospect of cyber attacks
and information security the boundaries fencing off states against the other,
demarcating the international sphere from the domestic sphere, the public
from the private, peace from war and the military from the civil, are dissolved.
One of the major implications of cyber threats is that the security of the
information system on which the entire network of organisation, individuals,
groups and even states hinges, is challenged. Besides, the very impregnability
and invincibility of sovereign state system is challenged.28 The very foundation
of sovereign state system that it is solely capable of serving control of the
national territory and the people residing within it, is shaken. External
sovereignty is also at stake due to easy accessibility to computer networks of
all for manipulation and exploitation.
Security Studies Silent about Information Security
Security studies resolve basically around two contending positions –
traditionalists and the wideners. The traditionalists hold on to their ingrained
stance that security is basically state-centric and military-oriented. Despite
cataclysmic changes in the international realm in terms of the end of Cold
War, growing spate of ethnic and religious insurgence, global terrorism,
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transnational crime and global warming, their age-long stance on state-centric
security has not changed because of their preference for theoretical clarity
and coherence.29
The wideners in contrast to the traditionalists claim that the concept of
security should be widened to include within its ambit the new challenges,
threats emanating not only from other states, but from the political, societal,
economic and environmental sectors.30 Whereas in the traditionalists’ view
state was the center piece of security, in the widener’s view state is not the
only linchpin of security concern, there are other non-state actors like NGOs,
social movements, terrorist organisations, private firms and individuals who
pretend status equally with states in the security concerns. The traditionalists’
focus is on the state, but distancing away from the state the wideners focus on
individual under the rubric ‘human security’. What is surprising is that in
their broadened perspective no attention has been paid to the information
revolution and its impact on security. While their concept of widened security
incorporates everything spanning political, electronic, ecological and cultural
issues, it rarely addresses the emergence of Internet and information revolution
and their impact on security. On the other hand, some traditionalists have
tended to give importance to development of information technology to the
extent it has been of immense utility to improvement of military capabilities.31
Enhancement of material capabilities has always been considered crucial
to state-centric and military-oriented national security. Intelligence gathering
and psychological warfare (a play of information operations) are also
considered as elements of material capabilities of states and intrigue parts of
warfare. The military and material aspects of states have evinced a greater
interest in technological and information revolution as these would enhance
their military capability and modernise the technology of warfare. The passage
of state military apparatus from machine guns to radar and satellites
demonstrates the interest traditionalists have shown in the utility of information
technology to the enhancement and modernisation of military capability of
states. ‘Electronic warfare’ has been an established practice and concept within
the military for several decades. But most traditionalists while sticking to
their conventionally held stand on state-centric security are of the view that
“information technologies are merely a new fancy add on.”32
Relevance of Information Security from the Perspective of Major IR
Theories on Security
The contemporary international relations is mainly dominated by three
theoretical perspectives –realism, liberalism and constructivism, which are
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perceived and portrayed as separate perspectives, though these have linkages,
overlaps and internal varieties. In the light of the digital age and information
revolution, the relevance of each perspective can be examined.
Realism
Despite information revolution in the digital age, realists have preferred
to cling to their main thesis that state is the sole and main actor in both domestic
and world politics with primacy on military power and process, denying the
non-state actors any power to play along with state. They would like to face
the challenges of the information revolution in much the same way as they
have tackled previous challenges of transnationalisation, complex interdepen-
dence and globalisation. These challenges may affect the policies of domestic
politics and structure of the state but would not any way undermine the primacy
of state as the supreme political unit and change their ingrained view about
the anarchic international system.
The realist would like to treat the ICT related security threats as coming
under the rubric of economic issue not as security threats in themselves to
penetrate into bastion of impregnability of states. There are some realistic
still inclined to define a narrow military-centric definition of security, and
believe that if widening of the concept of security is warranted, then it should
incorporate the economic dimension without compromising its primacy.33
Interestingly, they try to understand the new information warfare as new and
digressing away from state but as a component in otherwise traditional
interstate conflict.34
The case of electronic warfare such as the jamming of radio
communication since the WW II for a much shorter time has been an element
of inter-state conflict. To realists this is not threat, it is rather a change in the
warfare within the state military apparatus presaging the greater change in
the digital age warfare, which comes within the military apparatus of state as
a part of its modernisation process. The realists view the introduction of
information warfare in strategic studies and military planning as a part of its
modernisation process. The realists view the introduction of information
warfare in strategic studies and military planning as a continuation of its
traditional military thinking, not as a dramatic change envisaging the overhaul
of the state centric security paradigm. The information revolution may have
introduced new technologies into the warfare with new digital adversaries,
“but the basic notion of attacking at defending information systems are as old
as warfare itself- basically old wine in new bottles.”35
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Liberalism
Rejecting the realist view as one-sided and normally focused, the
sociological liberalism holds that international relation is not only about state-
state relation, it is also about transnational relations, that is relation between
people, groups and organisations belonging to different countries. State is
not the only actor, there are plurality of non-state actors. Transnational relations
are considered by sociological liberals to be an increasingly important aspect
of international relation. According to Rosenau, trans-nationalism
marks “the process whereby international relations conducted by governments
have been supplemented by relations among private individuals, groups and
societies that can and do have important consequence for the course of
events.”36 In a similar vein, Karl Deutsch argued that a high degree of
transnational ties between societies leads to peaceful relations that amounts
to what is called ‘security community’.37 John Burton in his book, World
Society (1972), purposes a ‘cobweb model’ of transnational relationships
among different groups of people – religions, business, labour, with different
types of external ties and different types of interests.
Rosenau studies transnational relation at the macro-level of human
population coupled with those conducted at the micro-level by individuals.
Perceiving a profound transformation of the international system, he is of the
view that the state-centric anarchic system has not disappeared but a new
multi-centric world has emerged that is composed of diverse “sovereignty
free” collectivities, which exist apart from and in competition with the state-
centric world of sovereignty-bound actors.38
Interdependence liberalism is of the view that modernisation increases
the level and scope of interdependence between states. Under complex
interdependence, transnational actors are increasingly important, military force
is a less useful instrument, and welfare –not security-is becoming the primary
goal and concern of states. According to Rosecrance, the end of Cold War has
made the traditional option less urgent and thus less attractive. Consequently,
the trading-state option is increasingly preferred even by very large states.
David Mitrany (1960) put forth a functionalist theory of integration arguing
that greater interdependence in the form of transnational ties between countries
could lead to peace. Built on Mitrany’s functionalism but rejecting his
separation of technical experts from politicians, Ernst Haas enunciated the
doctrine of neo-functionalist theory of international integration which is a
process whereby “political actors are persuaded to shift their loyalties toward
a new center where institution possesses or demands jurisdiction over the
preexisting national states.39
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Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (1977),
propounded a general theory of what they called “complex interdependence”,
which is qualitatively different from earlier and simpler kinds of interdepen-
dence.40 Under conditions of complex interdependence relations between
states nowadays, or even primarily relations between state leaders, there are
relations on many different levels via different actors and branches of
government between individuals and groups outside of the state. Further,
military force is a less useful instrument of policy under conditions of complex
interdependence. In the words of Nye:
The appropriate response to the changes occurring in world politics today
is not to discredit the traditional wisdom of realism and its concern for the
military balance of power, but to realise its limitation and to supplement it
with insights from the liberal approach.”41
Institutional liberals differ from realists in that international institutions
are mere scraps of paper and that they remain always hostage to the powerful
states. International institutions are always of interdependent importance
promoting cooperation between states.42
One way to assess the institutional liberal view is to set it against that of
neo-realist analysis. Neo-realists argue that the end of Cold War is likely to
bring the return of instability. But the institutional liberals (Keohane, Nye,
Keohane) are of the view that a high level of institutionalisation significantly
reduces the destabilising effects of multi-polar anarchy identified by
Mearsheimer.43 While promoting cooperation between states, institutional
liberalism can help alleviate the lack of trust between states and states’ fear
of each other, which are considered to be the traditional problems associated
with international anarchy.
Having with it the normative element the Republican Liberalism advocates
that democracies do not go to war against each other owing to their domestic
culture of peaceful conflict resolution, their common moral values, and their
mutually beneficial ties of economic cooperation and interdependence.44
To sum up this, it can be said that the development of increasingly complex
and globally penetrating web of transnational relations and emergence of non-
state actors has challenged the political and economic stranglehold of the
state and made it pregnable against the perforating penetration of transnational
relations.
With shift of emphasis on state to other non-state actors and other
transnational relations, liberalism has broadened the definition of what
international relations is about, and regarded economics as much important
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as security. As a result, some liberals advocated a widened perspective of
security, which includes economic, ecological and human security concerns.
Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, the advocates of theory of complex
interdependence in the 1970s, have recently updated this to meet the challenges
of the digital age.45 While treating the costs of interdependence in terms of
vulnerability and sensitivity as new component of the theory and frame them
purely in economic terms not portrayed as matters of national and international
security, they have analysed the impact of information revolution on
international relations.46
Nye is of the view that national security defined as the absence of threat
to major values can be at stake. Within his theoretical framework is found
absence of any elaborated analysis of critique of cyber security threats.
Nonetheless, his concept of ‘soft power’ can be of relevance to this topic.
Soft power is the “ability to get what you want through attraction rather than
coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture,
political ideals, and policies…. Soft power rests on the ability to shape the
performance of others.”47 Thus, modern liberalism seems to be greatly
influenced by Kantian and Wilsonian idealism.48 Nye wants these ideals to
spread to other parts of the globe, through the exercise of soft power. In his
view, relevance of soft power is more highlighted than ever in this digital age
because of the ever increasing evolution of multiple channels of global
communication transcending the sovereign boundaries.49 It would be a mistake
to imagine that the soft power and global ICTs that facilitate the opening of
multiple channels of communication and interaction are only instruments of
cooperation, democratisation and peace, as Nye and other liberals would like
to believe. These channels may be exactly the opposite instruments of
deception, propaganda, threats and terror.
Casting aside its idealism and fear of treading on realist furrow of security
analysis, liberalism could be said to be throwing insights into the nature of
security threats in the digital age. In particular, this view is sustained and
reinforced by the attention that the liberals pay to the growing emergence of
non-state sovereignty free actors and the global complex interdependence in
costs in terms of vulnerability and sensitivity. Eriksson and Giacomello cite
two socio-economic trends that are found consistent with the dictum of liberal
theory:
(1) expanding partnership between the public and private sector to
provide services;
(2) merging of the civil and military spheres.50
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The very recognition of their growing incapability to meet the burgeoning
demands of the modern societies has led the governments to promote public-
private partnership. The trends of privatisation in the age of market economy
quite evident in the sectors of health, education, transport and other services
have been extended to national security. For example, in the United States,
the National Strategy to secure cyberspace of the President’s Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board of September 2002 relies on public-private
partnership, conceding that “Government alone cannot secure cyberspace.”51
This has resulted in what is called civilianisation of the military or, perhaps,
militarisation of the society.”52
No sector is most apparently permeated by this integration and complex
interdependence than the telecom sector. It has always been the practice with
the military to use the help of civilian telecom networks. Nowadays the
dependence of vast majority of military communication on civilian networks
for transmission has been profusely vast. Computer networks have been
incorporated into the development of hard military powers and have formed
the foundation of soft power.53
It needs a critical analysis of the question whether a theory that was
originally crafted to study actors and process in a political-economy context,
can dovetail the impact of information revolution in a digital age into their
theory. The question still remains unanswered whether the development of
the ICTs in the age of globalisation and modernisation is a continuation of
the process of transnationalisation and complex web of interdependence.
Nevertheless, cyber threats and challenges of information revolution
representing the current trends of development in the age of globalisation
appear to emasculate the sovereignty and security of the states. The non-state
actors are numerically spawning and becoming powerful as found from their
active participation and involvement in various domestic and international
issues, because of information revolution. The emergence of Internet and
network of communications and interaction with online groups may have
facilitated integration, cooperation and liberation transcending the barricades
of state sovereignty from a positive perspective, but certainly have brightened
the prospect of terrorism, transnational crime and the destabilisation of
states.
The very recognition that beside state there are a plurality of non-state
actors is the very valuable contribution by liberalism to theory building with
regard to security in the digital age. But this still remains underdeveloped.
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Arquilla and Ronfeldt are among the few scholars who also study mainstream
liberal notion of globalisation and other challenges to state sovereignty and
address explicitly the issue of actor plurality in the digital age.54
Constructivism
Rejecting the one-sided material focus of realists, constructivists argue
that the most important aspect of international relations is social, not material.
In their views, the social reality is not objective or external. The social and
political world including the world of international relations is not a physical
entity or material object that is independent of human consciousness.
Consequently, the study of IR must focus on the ideas and beliefs that inform
the actors on the international scene as well as the shared understandings
between them.
Liberalism basically founded and on neo-realist assumptions as starting
point is vulnerable to the diatribes directed against neo-realism by
constructivists. After the end of the Cold War some liberals began to focus on
the role of ideas. Fukuyama’s End of History (1989) focused on the role of
the ideas in spreading democratic and liberal values to all parts of the globe.
Even if constructivists are sympathetic to several elements of liberal thinking,
their focus is less on advance of liberal ideas, than on the role of thinking and
ideas in general.
Constructivists maintain that the social world is in part constructed by
physical entities or material reality. But it is the ideas and beliefs concerning
those entities which are most important. The international system of security
and defense, for example, consists of territories, populations, weapons and
other physical assets, computers, ICTs and communication channels that could
also be included within its ambit. But it is the ideas and understandings
according to which those assets are conceived, organised and used that is
most important. This could be termed social reality. “The thought that is
involved in international security is more important, far more important than
the physical assets that are involved because those assets have no meaning
without the intellectual component: they are mere things in themselves.”55 To
quote Wendt: “The claim is not that ideas are more important than power and
interest, or that they are autonomous from power and interests. The claim is
rather that power and interests have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas
that make them up.”56
Constructivism does not take a general stance as to what can be or cannot
be framed as a security threat and how such threat can be dealt with. It focuses
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on the verb “become rather than can or cannot”;57 constructivist security studies
emphasises on identity and culturally related threats, which are downplayed
in realist and liberal accounts of security.58 The empirical amenability of
constructivism to the widest possible range of perceived security threats makes
it possible to address all kinds of threats. “In terms of threats to critical
infrastructures, this would, for example, include not only digital attacks, but
also technical collapses and bugs such as the infamous Y2K problem, as well
as natural disasters such as earthquakes and violent eruption.”59
The constructive approach to security is the theory of “securitisation”
developed by the Copenhagen School. This is about how, when and with
what consequences political actors construct something as a matter of
security.60 The emphasis is on speech acts i.e. political language and the
implication this has for political agenda setting and political relations.
Securitisation implies that an “existential threat” is identified, and the “speech
act” prioritises the issue on the political agenda, legitimating extraordinary
measures such as secrecy, the use of force and the invasion of privacy. But on
its advocacy of widening of security agenda, the Copenhagen School has lost
sight of the information revolution.
Eriksson has pioneered the study of securitisation of information
technology in Swadeshi politics. His analysis demonstrates the impact of
different frame of IT related threats on whom or what is blamed, and who is
allocated responsibility for dealing with the problems.61 Framing an incident
as “cybercrime” implies that criminals are to be blamed, and that the police
are responsible for dealing with them. In contrast, the same incident can also
be framed as an instance of ‘information warfare’ which implies that enemies
to a given nation state, other states or non state actors are to be blamed, and
that the military has a responsibility to respond to the threat.62
In the current analysis of digital security threats the constructivists put
emphasis on how information warfare challenges a multitude of boundaries,
notably boundaries of identity. Everard (2000) argues that information warfare
is a particular kind of “identity warfare” in which all kind of boundaries are
challenged, including the classical domestic international divide. Hence
the identity of nation state is always threatened, although it may adapt to the
constant penetration into the sovereign state by cyber threats, and to the
emergence and articulation of new identities in cyber space.63
In addition to material reality of computers and cables, the significance
of images and symbols finds a peremptory place in the constructive analysis
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of power and security in a virtual world. Distancing of actors from the bloody
war has been one of the many effects of war in the digital age.64
Due to Internet and Information Revolution from anywhere in the world,
a computer can be attacked in distant places of the world. Having said this, it
does not in any way undermine the significance of decreasing geographical
distance. What is significant here is how virtuality affects the conduct and
perception of the war. Digital war is akin to computer games to the extent
that simulation is performed and perceived in the same way by using the
mouse and keyboard of a computer. The boundary between the real and
imagined is thus blurred. What is important here is to note that the film,
tabloid and computer gaming industries with their effects, tactical tools and
software have become an increasingly important source of inspiration and
expertise for the military.65
The use and abuse of symbols for manipulating political discourse and
public opinion known as symbolic politics has assumed significance for
studying digital age security. Long before the information revolution came
into the picture, the symbolic politics of approach for the first time laid by
Murray Edelman could be held as a constructivist contribution in social
science.66
Defacing websites, a noteworthy practice of symbolic politics can be
compared to the burning of an enemy’s flag. What is important here is not the
negligible cost involved in mending a website and securing a server; the cost
in terms of lost confidence, disparagement and feeling of vulnerability,
however, is immense. Assaults and counter attacks against USA and Chinese
Government websites by hackers from the respective countries are very much
in the news. Similar digital wars are going on between Israeli and Arab hackers
and between Indian and Pakistani ones. This symbolic politics approach, much
practiced in computers, smacks of how and why these actions are seen as an
insult and offense to national pride. The Internet has become the new global
battlefield for symbolic politics.
The function and impact of language in digital age security has been
illustrated by the constructivist analysis. Frequent reference to bugs, viruses,
worms and fire walls in computer with analogies to things familiar in the real
or off-line world has rendered the abstract and technically complex world of
cyber security intelligible.67 Although the information warfare and electronic
Pearl Harbor are constantly referred to as digital by nature, it has nonetheless
physical consequences equal to those of conventional war. Constructivist
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analysis can play a significant role in revealing and understanding the
importance of rhetoric and symbolic actions in politics. Eriksson and
Giacomello have very succinctly attempted to demonstrate the need to develop
middle range theories integrating liberalism, constructivism and realism for
comprehending the impact of information revolution on security.
Conclusion
As found out from the above analysis of various theories on security,
short shrift has been paid to the security problems of the digital age by the
scholars. Realism persists with its entrenched habit of putting emphasis
on state and its military apparatus. On the other hand, liberalism and
constructivism have widened the base of security and made a discursive
approach to security. Liberalism denuded of its idealist and anti-realist
pretensions entails within it many of the elements of the security in the digital
age. The advocacy of multiplicity of non-state actors with transnational
capacity, network economics, vulnerability, interdependence and consequent
perforation of formally sovereign boundaries have enabled it to grasp the
impact of information revolution on security. In a similar vein, constructivism
has analysed the symbolic, rhetorical and identity based aspects of digital age
security. Realism has tried to understand the impact of information revolution
and digital age security by subsuming it under state as it was wont to
understanding globalisation and other challenges by relating it to political
economy or domestic politics under the rubric “state.”
Even in the classical realist formulation of security, information warfare
is merely held as the technological continuation of classical forms of
psychological warfare and more recently of electronic warfare. In this classical
perspective the developments in the information technology in the digital age
are seen as nothing but an unfolding of technological change in the military
warfare within a military-centric state. The foregoing analysis demonstrates
how the IR theories on security are plagued by the dichotomy between theory
and practice in the digital age. All current theories are inherently weak so far
as the theoretical adoption and application in analysis of the complexities of
the emerging information revolution in the digital world are concerned.
Therefore, adoption of a pragmatic approach founded on bridging the gap
between theory and practice by taking insights from methodological pluralism
and theoretical complementarities seems warranted to incorporate digital
security into the corpus of IR theories.
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